Several studies have documented the impact of litigation on shareholders. Lawsuits can have significant explicit costs and have been shown to cause negative stock price reactions when filed. However, little is known about how firm managers respond to this costly reality. Anecdotal evidence suggests firms may adjust financial policy to build a war chest in anticipation of litigation. Alternatively, firms may increase the probability of bankruptcy to reduce the payoffs to potential litigants and protect shareholder assets. By looking at changes to a firm's litigation environment, I test whether and how a firm's risk of litigation impacts its overall financial policy. I find that higher litigation exposure leads firms to choose higher leverage. I show that this leverage increase is brought on by an active decision to repurchase shares. These repurchases appear to be financed with a combination of excess cash and short term debt as they coincide with a significant decrease in cash holdings and an increase in short term liabilities. Furthermore, these results appear to be stronger in firms that are financially distressed and face a higher chance of bankruptcy due to litigation. I show that these findings are not the result of changes in an industry equilibrium brought about by the financial distress of other sued firms, but rather a strategic response to an increase in litigation risk. These results are consistent with the idea that firms strategically take action in the face of increased litigation risk to shield their assets from potential fees, judgements, and settlements due to litigation.
Introduction
Litigation exposure is an undeniable reality for firms in today's marketplace. Blockbuster product liability suits against large corporations frequently make headlines in the news media and tort reform is a common political talking point. A firm exposed to major civil litigation can find itself spending millions in legal fees, settlements, and/or judgements. In extreme cases, large judgments have the potential to force firms into bankruptcy. It is reasonable to assume that, in equilibrium, a firm's management takes this risk of litigation into account in developing operational and financial strategies. In this paper, I examine how firms react when the legal environment changes. Specifically, I examine whether managers alter financial policy to shield assets in the face of increased litigation risk.
There are several ways in which firms could use financial policy when considering litigation exposure. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some firms may increase their cash holdings (potentially through a reduction in dividends and/or investment) in order to build a "war chest" to defend against civil litigation.
1 Alternatively, firms may choose to increase the use of debt. As Spier and Sykes (1998) point out, a firm's capital structure can play an important role in the bargaining process related to civil litigation if there is a positive probability that a civil judgment will force the firm into bankruptcy. They show that a firm can use both secured and unsecured debt to reduce the value of civil claims against the firm. This finding is due generally to the fact that the civil litigants have a junior claim in bankruptcy.
Strategic financial policy can therefore reduce the cost of litigation borne ultimately by the shareholders by reducing settlement amounts (which may, ex-ante, reduce the probability of litigation by reducing the potential payoff to litigants.)
The difficulty in determining whether (or how) firms use financial policy to mitigate exposure 1 See for example "Merck & Co Inc -Merck Finally to Answer for VIOXX Injuries", Market News Publishing, November 9, 2006. to the costs associated with litigation is that the probability that a firm is sued may be related to the overall financial policy decisions of the firm. There are several reasons why this may be true. Poor firm performance generally may increase the probability of a lawsuit (for example if product quality suffers due to cost cutting measures). This same poor performance may also have a significant impact on the financial policy decisions of the firm. In other cases, the financial policy decisions of the firm may actually be the cause of the litigation (securities class-action for example). In either case, this endogeneity with respect to financial policy and the risk of litigation makes it difficult to study how firms respond specifically to litigation risk.
In order to mitigate this problem, I take advantage of exogenous variation in the probability of litigation by proxying for litigation exposure using the number of litigation events within that firm's industry over time. Put simply, industry trends in litigation may tell us about the risk of a lawsuit that a given firm faces even though those industry trends are unrelated to the specific financial policy decisions of a particular firm. For example, a product liability suit against firm A may signal a shift in the litigation environment. Due to legal trends, judicial precedent, or even the success of plaintiffs attorneys, this lawsuit may increase the probability that firm B is ultimately sued, even though the lawsuit against firm A is independent of firm B's financial policy or performance. Using this basic idea and data on actual litigation, I construct a proxy for exogenous changes in the probability of a lawsuit for each firm through time and use this measure to test whether (and how) firms respond to changes in their litigation environment. I validate this proxy by showing that it is significantly related to the probability that a firm is actually sued.
Using this measure, I test if and how financial policy is impacted by the litigation environment. My results indicate that, in periods with a higher risk of litigation, firms choose higher leverage. I show that this is not a passive result due to firm performance, but rather an active decision by managers. These firms buy back significantly more shares of common stock when the risk of litigation is high. I show that these share repurchases appear to be financed with cash holdings and an increase in short-term liabilities. These findings are consistent with firms increasing the use of debt in order increase bargaining power in the settlement process and to shield assets from litigants. Finally, I show that these results are stronger for those firms that are likely to be financially distressed -a result consistent with the idea that this strategy is effective only when there is a non zero probability that a given lawsuit will force the firm into bankruptcy. I find no support for the idea that firms may actually reduce leverage and/or hoard cash in order to build a "war chest" to defend against litigation.
This paper contributes to the literature in two primary ways. First, it adds to our understanding of the litigation process. Prior research has demonstrated the negative impact of litigation on common shareholders, who ultimately bear the cost of litigation settlements and judgments.
2 This work has established that litigation is costly and that it has a significant negative impact on shareholders (for example, see the case study of Cutler and Summers (1987) who examine the costs related to the Texaco-Pennzoil litigation). Several other papers have established the negative impact of litigation filings on firm stock price as well as the negative price reaction to firm settlements. 3 Because lawsuits are an undeniable and costly reality to all firms, it is important that we understand if and how management uses financial policy to best manage the risk and costs associated with litigation. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that attempts to empirically examine this.
4
2 Debt holders are largely insulated from litigation concerns provided that a the strict priority rule is followed in the case of bankruptcy 3 Specifically, Bhagat et al. (1994) examine the wealth effects of inter-firm litigation and show that defendant stock price drops and total wealth between firms falls. Bhagat et al. (1998) continue this research by examining the effect of the type of litigation and by looking at the market reaction upon conclusion of the case. Karpoff and Lott (1999) show that share price drops after legal settlements. 4 The possible exception to this is Haslem (2005) , who goes beyond stock price responses by looking at agency conflicts in the settlement process. He looks at litigation and settlements, but focuses on the impact of corporate governance on the settlement process, documenting the fact that the market reacts negatively to settlements when compared to judgments (even losing judgments) because of the potential agency conflicts associated with the settlement process. While he provides evidence that certain firm characteristics impact settlement behavior and market responses, he does not look explicitly at management behavior or financial policy Secondly, this paper adds to the literature on the strategic use of financial policy. Several theoretical works have explored the bargaining aspects of capital structure. These papers include those on contract bargaining generally (Perotti and Spier (1993) ), bargaining with suppliers and employees (Dasgupta and Sengupta (1993) ), bargaining with unions (Bronars and Deere (1991) , and the strategic use of debt in the face of takeovers (Israel (1991) ).
Many empirical papers find support for these ideas generally, but this paper provides the first empirical test demonstrating the strategic use of capital structure when dealing with litigants -a class of stakeholder that has not been explicitly considered in the prior research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data used in the empirical tests and the construction of the main proxy variable. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology and results and section 4 concludes.
Data and Proxy Construction

Data
In order to examine the impact of the litigation on a firm's financial policy, it is necessary to develop a proxy for the firm's litigation environment. To do so, I examine those litigation events that are likely to signal change in the litigation environment of the industry as a whole. Those industry lawsuits that are most likely to signal this change are likely to be the large, well publicized cases. To find of a sample of such cases, I use actual litigation events as reported by the Audit Analytics Litigation database. These data report information on litigation for the Russell 1000 firms from 1.) legal disclosures filed with the SEC, 2.) litigation details related to class-action and other civil litigation from disclosures and newswires, and 3.) registrations and legal opinions filed with the SEC. The data cover the period from [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . From this sample of litigation, Audit Analytics collects details related to the specific litigation, including original date of filing, and if available, the original claim and settlement amounts.
5 While this is in no way an exhaustive list of all litigation faced by the Russell 1000 firms, it is likely to capture all materially large cases, which for the purposes of this study are the cases most likely to cause variation in the litigation environment.
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These litigation data are then matched to quarterly financial data over the same period with quarterly financial and return data (calculated from monthly returns) in the quarter in which the case began. It is important to note that many of the cases may involve multiple public firms and as such will be matched more than once. Securities class action litigation is dropped from the sample to avoid endogeneity concerns induced by litigation directly related to firm financial policy. Table 1 presents the number of cases in the merged sample as well as summary statistics on the size of the claims and settlements as reported by Audit Analytics.
While there is a relatively large sample of litigation events (7781 cases), the number of cases with detailed information on the size of the claim or the settlement is relatively small (8.7%
and 10.3% of the overall sample respectively). The second row of table 1 illustrates that for those cases in which claim data is available, the median claim is quite small at $0.71 million.
However, a number of very large suits skew the results considerably, resulting in a mean claim value of $31 billion. Because juries are allowed to award no more than the maximum sought by the plaintiff in the original claim, these numbers are likely to be upwardly biased relative to the true expected loss the firm faces from the litigation. The settlement numbers, while also skewed, are more likely to represent the expected value of the litigation. As can be seen from table 1, the median settlement amount is $7.4 million while the mean of $88.1 million is skewed by a number of very large suits. The standard deviation of the settlement amounts in the data is $434 million.
The final sample of litigation events covers a wide range of industries. The industry with the least number of cases in the Audit Analytics data is the Social Services industry which has approx. .08 new cases per quarter. Table 2 demonstrates that Audit
Analytics provides broad industry coverage with respect to the litigation data. These data are shown at the 2-digit SIC level for the sake of brevity. As is clear from the BUSINESS SERVICES category, these industry classifications may be too broad to successfully measure the litigation environment (it is unlikely that the litigation with respect to pest control will have a significant impact on the litigation environment of data processing firms). As such, most of the tests described below will relay on industry classifications defined at the 3 or 4-digit SIC code level. Flow is defined as operating income minus interest, taxes, and dividends divided by assets.
Proxy Construction
To construct a proxy for the litigation environment of a firm, I examine the number of cases that begin in each industry each quarter. For each firm, i, in each quarter, t, I count the number of new cases that began for all firms in that industry exclusive of any new cases involving firm i in that quarter. The calculation for the proxy variable is given by:
where n is the total number of firms in firm i 's industry, k is the total number of litigation cases for firm n across the sample and I t is an indicator function equal to 1 if that case began in quarter t. Industry in this case is defined at the 3-digit SIC code level.
7 This variable will take on larger values when a large number of cases are filed against a firm's competitors. I
claim that these periods represent times when the probability of litigation is higher across all firms in the industry, regardless of a firm's specific characteristics.
To test whether this proxy seems to capture an exogenous increase in the risk of litigation, I estimate the probability that a firm is sued in quarter t, conditional on that firms characteristics and the LitigationEnvironment at t-1. Table 4 shows the results of conditional logit estimations under three separate specifications. Each model is estimated with groups defined at the firm level to control for unobserved firm effects. Year dummies are also included across specifications and to correct for correlation in the error terms, standard errors are clustered by 3 digit sic code (because the proxy variable is an industry level variable) 8 . As shown in column 1, the impact of the LitigationEnvironment t−1 is positively and significantly related to the probability that a firm is sued in the next period, even after controlling for a variety 7 All results are qualitatively similar when using a variable defined at the 4-digit level 8 The groups over which the conditional logit model are defined must be nested within the clusters used in the standard error correction. Because of this, this model is run only on firms that maintain the same 3 digit SIC code over the entire period. Point estimates are similar when the model is run over the entire sample with standard errors clustered by firm. However, in this case the standard errors are also lower of firm specific variables. This result indicates that an increase of 1 lawsuit among other firms in that industry in the prior quarter increases the odds that a firm will be sued in the current quarter by 1.017 times, or approximately 1.7%. This result is significant at the 1% level. The table also shows firms with lower market to book ratios have an economically and statistically higher probability of being sued. The odds ratios of this variable is approximately 0.60 across all specifications and is significant at the 5% level. In column 3, ROA and Industry Return t−1 are added to the model. Neither impact the point estimates or the standard errors from the previous specifications in any meaningful way. These results across the three models are consistent with firms that are performing poorly or are in industries in which there are recent lawsuits being targets for litigation. It is important to note that even after controlling for a variety of firm characteristics across the three specifications, the odds ratio on the LitigationEnvironment t−1 is always economically and statistically significant, suggesting that this is a reasonable proxy for an exogenous change in the litigation environment.
Finally, in columns 2 and 3 of table 4, the firm's debt to assets ratio is included. It is of note that this does not appear to be an important determinant of the probability of litigation.
Because the debt to assets ratio is relatively time invariant, these estimates may be impacted by the firm level conditioning in the logit model; nonetheless, it may suggest that if firms are adjusting their capital structure in response to litigation they may be doing so not to prevent lawsuits, but instead to increase bargaining power in the settlement of those lawsuits.
Results
Having developed a proxy for a firm's litigation environment, I examine firm financial policy decisions to determine if the litigation environment plays a role in those decisions. Specifically, I look at firm cash holdings, payout policy (specifically stock repurchases), and capital structure. Examining the firms' capital structure allows us to better understand if firms are acting strategically to increase their bargaining power in the face of litigation. Cash holdings will tell us if firms that face a higher probability of litigation maintain higher cash reserves in support of the "war chest" theory. Alternatively, firms may reduce their cash holdings, either through irreversible investment or increased payout, in an effort to reduce the amount of liquid assets available to potential litigants. Finally, looking at a firm's payout policy will help to determine whether managers are taking active steps in the face of this litigation, or whether capital structure and/or cash holdings are changing passively as a result of firm performance.
Each of these particular areas of financial policy has extensive literature related to the cross sectional determinants. I utilize this previous literature and supplement those previously identified cross-sectional determinants with my proxy for a change in litigation environment. Harris and Raviv (1991) provide a very extensive summary of capital structure literature as of 1991. Titman and Wessels (1988) and Hovakimian et al. (2001) provide evidence of the cross-sectional determinants of debt levels that I rely on in the tests of capital structure. Rajan and Zingales (1995) look at capital structure internationally but also distill the list of cross-sectional control variables into a smaller, more manageable set in the face of limited data. Opler et al. (1999) provide a good summary of literature related to cash holdings. This work establishes a set of important cross-sectional determinants of the cash holdings of firms. Finally, Fenn and Liang (2001) provide a review of the literature related to payout policy as well as a set of control variables for payout policy analysis.
Capital Structure
If firms are in fact acting strategically to increase their litigation bargaining power, then those firms facing a higher probability of litigation should utilize more debt in their capital structure. Using the panel of firm specific data described above, I am able to test this hypothesis. Using the 7 year sample of quarterly data, I run a pooled OLS regression which includes my proxy variable for the litigation environment. The specification for these tests generally is:
where X i,t represents a vector of control variables for firm i at time t. The vector of control variables includes those shown to be important in the cross-sectional tests of capital structure (see Titman and Wessels (1988) , Hovakimian et al. (2001) , Rajan and Zingales (1995) , and Harris and Raviv (1991) .) These include Ln Size, Mkt. to Book, Asset Tangibility, Ln Sales, ROA, and Return t−1 . Table 5 shows the results of these regressions. Column 1 of the table shows a basic regression specification using the firm's litigation environment as an explanatory variable along with basic firm characteristics and firm fixed effects. This regression shows that as the risk of litigation increases, leverage actually increases as well. Columns 2-5 of table 5 add various combinations of control variables and indicator dummies and show that generally, when the risk of litigation is high, so is firm leverage. These results show that an increase of 1 lawsuit over a firm's industry mean is associated with an increase in firm leverage between 0.00012 and 0.00017. These results are robust to using firm-year dummies (Columns 2-4), as well as to using firm and firm plus year dummies (Column 1 and 5 respectively.) This result is statistically significant across all of these specifications at the 1% level. In terms of economic significance, a coefficient of 0.00017 represents an increase of roughly 0.06% of the overall mean leverage and 0.11% of the median leverage for each additional lawsuit.
As expected, Ln Size, Asset Tangibility, Ln Sales, ROA, and the lagged return are all signifi-cant across the specifications in columns 1-5 and are generally consistent with prior literature.
The coefficient on Ln Size ranges from -0.025 to -0.046 and is statistically significant at the 5% level or better. This result is consistent with prior evidence that smaller firms have lower leverage. The coefficients on Asset Tangibility range from 0.23 to 0.28 and are statistically significant at the 1% level across all specifications. Ln Sales is marginally significant in all specifications, with the largest effect having a coefficient generally around 0.009.
One potential concern regarding the use of the industry lawsuits as a proxy is that this variable may merely be capturing firm and industry performance. If firms are more likely to be sued when performance is poor and firms in the same industry suffer poor performance at similar times, then this variable may only be capturing this effect. In order to control for this, I include both firm and industry performance variables including ROA, lagged industry and firm returns, and Mkt. to Book. Even after controlling for this issue, the litigation environment variable is still positive and significant. ROA and Quarterly Return y−1 are negative and significant across specifications, consistent with the idea that better performing firms have less debt. For these specifications, Mkt. to Book is not statistically significant; this result is inconsistent with much of the prior literature. This is largely attributable to the specific sample used in this case as well as the firm-year fixed effects. It is worth noting that the R 2 value across the specifications in Columns 1-5 is greater than 70%, indicating that the variables included explain a great deal of the within firm and within firm-year variation.
Finally, in Column 6 of table 5, I present a simple changes model. This model calculates the changes of all variables from their value 4 quarters before. This has the same effect as the fixed effects regression in terms of removing unobserved heterogeneity, but it may be easier to interpret. Under this specification, the coefficient on LitigationEnvironment t−1 is still positive and significant, albeit slightly smaller. Nonetheless, under this simple changeon-change framework, the overall results still hold.
In unreported results, I also conducted this analysis in a Tobit framework to account for the truncation of leverage at 0 (Hovakimian et al. (2001) ). These results are qualitatively similar, although the interpretation of firm dummies is difficult in the non-linear setting. The results are also robust to using longer lags to proxy for the litigation environment, including LitigationEnvironment t−2 and LitigationEnvironment t−4 .
The Mechanism for Increased Leverage
The above results support the idea that firms may be using their capital structure strategically as the risk of litigation arises. In the following section I investigate how this increase in leverage occurs. On one hand, it is possible that as the litigation environment changes, firms suffer in terms of performance. If this poor performance leads to write-downs of assets then the increase in leverage may be largely mechanical, and not in fact attributable to some strategic decision made by firm management. On the other hand, firms may be taking active measures that increase leverage, either through a reduction in assets via dividends or share repurchases, or by raising additional debt capital.
I examine this issue by looking first at the payout policy of firms using a pooled OLS regression similar to the analysis for capital structure above. The specification is:
where X i,t represents a vector of control variables for firm i at time t. Payout is defined as either Payout/Assets,calculated as total dividends plus total repurchases divided by assets or Common Share Repurchase/Assets depending on the specification. I again use control variables based on prior literature on the determinants of payout policy. As in Fenn and Liang (2001) , I include Ln Size, Mkt. to Book, Debt/Assets, and ROA as control variables.
These regressions also includes firm-year dummies, so estimates are based on variation within firm-years. Table 6 shows the results from these regressions. Column 1 presents the results of the regression specification using total payout as the dependent variable. Due to the lack of variation in dividends generally, this model has relatively little explanatory power overall.
As expected, these results show that Payout/Assets is increasing in firm performance (as measured by Mkt. to Book and ROA). The coefficients (t-stats) are 0.00031 (1.86) and 0.0037 (2.33) respectively. In this specification, the coefficient on Litigation Environment t−1
is statistically significant but with a coefficient of zero at four decimal places. As the risk of litigation increases, total payout appears to be relatively unaffected.
Given the steady nature of dividends, this is not surprising. In Columns 2-4 I estimate models excluding dividends and preferred share repurchases. In these models, Litigation
Environment t−1 is statistically significant at the 5% level (10% in specification 2). The coefficients range from 0.00055 to 0.00067. Economically, these coefficients represent between 14% and 18% increase over the mean Common Share Repurchase/Assets over the entire sample. In these specifications Mkt. to Book is positive and significant at the 5% level with a coefficient of between 0.84 and 0.85. The coefficients on ROA range from -0.76 to -0.81
and are significant at the 1% level.
Funding Share Repurchase
Overall, the results suggest that managers are in fact taking active measures to increase leverage when the risk of litigation is high. While dividends do not appear to be effected, share repurchases are significantly higher when a firm's peers face a greater number lawsuits.
In unreported tests, I find no evidence that firms are raising more debt capital. It appears that the effect on leverage is exclusively through share repurchase. However, the question still remains as to where the funds for the repurchase of these shares comes from.
To answer this question, I look first at cash holdings using a pooled OLS regression represented by the following equation:
where X i,t represents a vector of control variables for firm i at time t and δ i represents firm-year fixed effects. This regression is run on quarterly data where the control variables included are based on those variables determined by Opler et al. (1999) to have a significant impact on firm cash holdings. These include Ln Size, Cash Flow, Net Working Capital/Assets, Mkt. to Book, Debt/Assets, R&D/Sales, and lagged returns. The regression also includes firm-year fixed effects. Table 7 , column 1, shows the results of this regression. We see that cash holdings are lower for firms facing a higher risk of litigation. The coefficient is -0.00006 and is significant at the 5% level. Mkt. to Book, Cash Flow, and both lagged firm and industry returns are positively and significantly related to cash holdings. The coefficients on Net Working
Capital/Assets and Debt/Assets are both negative and significant. While the coefficient on Litigation Environment t−1 is small, it still represents approximately 0.03% of the overall mean cash holdings, suggesting that, on the margin, an increase in litigation exposure does reduce the cash holdings of firms on average. Column 2 of table 7 shows no significant effect of the litigation environment on total current assets.
The last two columns of table 7 examine another potential source of funds for the share repurchases shown above. Firms, in addition to reducing cash, may increase short term liabilities.
By using this short term leverage, firms may be provided with an additional source of capital that they can use to fund share repurchases. We see from columns 3 and 4 that the litigation environment has a positive and significant effect on both accounts payable and total current liabilities. In column 3, the coefficient on Litigation Environment t−1 is 0.00004 (or roughly 0.02% of the overall average accounts payable. The coefficient of Litigation Environment t−1 on total current liabilities is 0.00018, an increase of 0.08% for each additional lawsuit. Taken in conjunction with the results on cash holdings, these results suggests that firms are increasing their short term liabilities, and at the same time reducing their cash holdings when faced with an increased risk of litigation. These two results suggest a potential source of funds for these firms to increase leverage through share repurchase. Additionally, these results suggests that, on average, firms are not hoarding cash in preparation for litigation but are using cash to increase their overall leverage
Litigation and Industry Equilibrium
A potential alternative explanation for why firms' capital structure may change in response to a litigation event within the industry is that the litigation event may have triggered a shift in the industry leverage equilibrium. Shleifer and Visny (1992) suggest that the leverage within an industry is determined in part by the competitive nature of that industry. Certain firms position themselves to take advantage of growth opportunities in market up-swings (high leverage firms) while other firms in that industry may choose low leverage, leaving debt capacity so that they can acquire assets of highly levered firms during downturns in the business cycle. Significant firm litigation may lead to financial distress on the part of one firm within the industry, resulting in a shift in the equilibrium leverage across firms within that industry. Empirically, if what we are observing in capturing industry litigation is competition, we would expect those firms with lower leverage in an industry to be in a position to take advantage of distressed assets. These low leverage, low financial distress firms should be the ones increasing their leverage and at the same time increasing investment.
Alternatively, as Spier and Sykes (1998) point out, the use of leverage to strategically impact the litigation process is only a valid strategy when the risk of bankruptcy is real. If the behavior we observe with respect to capital structure and litigation is strategic, we would expect those firms with a higher probability of bankruptcy to increase their leverage more than those firms who are unlikely to default. This empirical prediction is counter to what we would expect if our leverage effect was do to industry competition and a change in the industry equilibrium leverage.
To test between these alternatives, I utilize the regression framework presented in by litigation, then we would expect that those firms are more likely to adjust their capital structure strategically. As shown in Column 1, the results are consistent with this hypothesis.
Larger firms are significantly less likely to increase leverage compared to smaller firms during periods when the litigation risk is high.
In column 2 of table 8 I look at the effect of a firm's relative leverage. I let High Debt Dummy t−1 equal 1 if the firm has higher than its industry median leverage in the prior quarter and zero otherwise. This term is then interacted with Litigation Environment t−1 .
The results suggest that firms that are most likely to be financially distressed (those with the highest leverage) will increase their leverage significantly more than those firms with low leverage. This result is significant at the 10% level and is consistent with the results on firm (2002)) or signal firm value (Vermaelen (1981) ). In such a case, controlling for firm and industry returns in the regression may not adequately control for the effect. However, if this is the case, we would expect those firms who find themselves in industries that are being sued but are not sued themselves to subsequently outperform. In untabulated results, I find no evidence that these firms' returns are higher in the following quarters or year, suggesting that this observed behavior is not a response to undervaluation but a strategic response to the risk of litigation.
Litigation Reform
Thus far, I have proxied for changes in the litigation environment by examining the number of lawsuits in a given industry. However, the litigation environment for a firm can also be altered by legislation and court decisions that make it harder or easier to sue a given firm or an industry. To provide further support for the results above without the noise induced by the litigation proxy variable, I turn to federal tort reform acts that reduced the expected litigation claims against firms within particular industries at some point in time.
While there have been 29 federal tort reforms according the American Tort Reform Association, many of these reforms apply to individuals or government agencies. However, two specific tort reforms relate to reducing the liability of particular industries. I examine the firms of both the coal mining and aircraft manufacturing industries, before and after the tort reforms described above to see if behavior changes are consistent with the results described in the previous sections. To do this, I split each industry into constrained firms (closer to financial distress) and unconstrained firms. I then look at these firms both before and after the tort reforms were enacted. This difference-in-differences approach will show whether the litigation reform appears to have changed the financial policy decisions of those firms. Based on the results above, prior to the tort reform (when the risk of litigation was higher) we would expect those constrained firms to hold less cash, have more short term debt (in terms of accounts payable) and repurchase more shares. We would then expect this difference to be smaller after the litigation reform as the risk to those firms decreases. Table 9 shows the results of this analysis. Each column represents one of the three financial policy variables (cash holdings, accounts payable, and share repurchases). Constrained firms (those more likely to be placed in financial distress by litigation) are defined as those firms smaller than the median firm within their industry in a given year.
11 Column 1 shows that the constrained firms hold less cash in general. We see that after litigation reform, this difference is smaller, consistent with the idea that these firms no longer have to shield as many of their assets. We see that with respect to accounts payable, the point estimates are consistent with the constrained firms using more short term debt and that this difference is smaller after the reduction in litigation exposure. However, these results are not statistically significant due to the low power of this test (with only two industries). Finally, column 3 shows the results for the share repurchase behavior of the firms. Again the results are insignificant but the point estimates are consistent with the results in the previous section.
Overall, while not overwhelmingly conclusive, these results suggest provide support for the large sample evidence without the need of a noisy proxy variable.
Conclusion
Litigation is an undeniable and costly realty for all firms in today's market place. While a great deal is known about the costs associated with litigation 12 , very little is known about the role that financial policy plays in dealing with this costly reality. Taking advantage of exogenous variation in the probability of litigation I use actual litigation events to construct a proxy for each firms litigation environment and test whether that environment impacts firm financial policy. My results indicate that, in periods with a higher risk of litigation,
11
The results using debt levels to proxy constraint are qualitatively similar 12 See Haslem (2005) for a summary of these findings firms choose higher leverage. I show that this is not a passive result due to firm performance, but rather an active decision by managers. These firms buy back significantly more shares of common stock when the risk of litigation is high and finance these repurchases using cash holdings and an increase in short-term liabilities. These findings are consistent with firms increasing the use of debt in order increase bargaining power in the settlement process.
Finally, I show that these results are stronger for those firms that face a greater risk of default due to litigation. After legislative reform, differences in financial policy between the firms most at risk of litigation and other firms in the industry decrease. These results are consistent with the idea that firms use financial policy strategically to increase bargaining power and ultimately limit the payoffs to potential litigants. Furthermore, I find no evidence that firms on average are hording cash in preparation for legal battles.
Overall, these results suggest that there may be a role for financial policy in dealing with civil litigation. They suggest that additional work in the area would be valuable in helping
to determine to what extent managers are successful in mitigating litigation exposure and minimizing costs. Debt/Assets is defined as total debt divided by total assets. Asset Tangibility is total property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets. Mkt. to Book is defined as the book value of debt plus the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. ROA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total assets. Cash Holdings is cash and short-term investments divided by total assets. Cash Flow is defined as operating income minus interest, taxes, and dividends divided by assets. Table 4 : Conditional Logit Model: Estimating the Probability of a Lawsuit This table presents a conditional logit model estimating the probability of a lawsuit in a given quarter for a given firm. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the firm is sued in that quarter and zero otherwise. The groups for the conditional model are defined at the firm level to control for firm specific omitted variables. Control variables include Ln Size, Mkt. to Book, defined as the book value of debt plus the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, and Asset Tangibility which is calculated as property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. All specifications include firm-year fixed effects. Odds Ratios are presented in lieu of coefficients. Standard errors are clustered at the 3 digit sic code. Mkt. to Book, defined as the book value of debt plus the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, ROA, defined as operating income divided by assets, and Asset Tangibility which is calculated as property, plant and equipment divided by total assets.
Also included are the lagged return and Ln Sales. Specifications in columns 1-6 include a variety of indicator variables to control for firm and year effects. Column 7 presents a simple change regression where all variables are calculated as differences from 4 quarters before. All specifications have standard errors clustered at the firm level. This table presents the results of a pooled OLS regression examining the effect of the litigation environment proxy, Litigation Environment i,t on firm capital structure. The dependant variable is Debt/Assets, defined as total debt divided by total assets. The regression is given by the form Debt/Assets i,t = β 0 + β 1 X i,t + γ 1 LitigationEnvironment t−1 + γ 2 F inancialDistress * LitigationEnvironment + i,t . Control variables include Ln Size, Mkt. to Book, defined as the book value of debt plus the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, ROA, defined as operating income divided by assets, and Asset Tangibility which is calculated as property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. Also included are the lagged return and Ln Sales. Financial distress is defined for columns 1-3 respectively as Ln Size, High Debt Dummy t−1 which is an indicator equal to 1 if the firm has higher leverage than its industry median and zero otherwise, and Investment Grade Dummy t−1 which is an indicator equal to 1 if the firm has investment grade debt ratings and equal to zero if the debt is unrated or below investment grade. Standard Errors Clustered by Firm. Absolute value t-stats presented. * significant at 10%, * * significant at 5%, * * * significant at 1%.
